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Introduction
The Ethiopian Anti Terrorism Proclamation No. 57( herein after referred to as ATP) came into 
force in August 2009. The enactment of this law is partly to respond to the Security Council 
Resolution No 1456, which calls upon states to enact anti terrorism laws, which specifically 
criminalize terrorist acts and that also impose proportionate sanctions that take into account the 
seriousness of the crime of terrorist acts. The ATP criminalizes a number of acts including 
terrorist acts and encouragement of terrorism. Indeed a number of human rights issues arise if 
one considers almost each article of the proclamation. Nonetheless, the thesis is limited to the 
study of the implications of the stipulation of the proclamation, which proscribes encouragement 
of terrorism on the enjoyment of freedom of expression as envisaged in both the Constitution of 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (hereinafter referred to as FDRE Constitution) and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (herein after referred to as CCPR), to 
which Ethiopia is a party.
Both the FDRE Constitution and the CCPR  guarantee freedom of expression. They also provide 
for the permissible ways of limiting freedom of expression. The ATP proscribes speech that 
encourages terrorism. This rule clearly  amounts to restriction on freedom of expression. Hence, 
the objective of the thesis is to analyze this rule which proscribes speech  that encourages 
terrorism within the meaning of the proclamation in light of the permissible limitation standards 
as set  out by both FDRE Constitution and CCPR. The three chapters of this thesis are, therefore 
destined to address this research question.
Accordingly, chapter one of the thesis deals with definition of terrorist  acts in the ATP. The 
specific elements of the definition as provided therein are closely analyzed by referring to the 
pertinent provisions of the ATP, the Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (hereinafter referred to as Criminal Code) and the FDRE Constitution. Where the need 
arises, definitions of terrorist acts in other jurisdictions are also consulted. This chapter lays 
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down the basic step  for the analysis of the stipulation on encouragement of terrorism as the later 
specifically refers to the definition of terrorist acts.
The second chapter explores the specific substances (contents) of freedom of expression as 
guaranteed in both FDRE Constitution and CCPR. It further considers the permissibility 
standards or tests that should be met by any law that purports to limit freedom of expression 
under both instruments. Accordingly, what conditions should be meet in order to lawfully restrict 
freedom of expression are dealt with in this chapter.
The last chapter, which is the main theme of the thesis addresses the issue whether the limitation 
regime introduced by the ATP in proscribing speech that encourages terrorism is compatible with 
the limitation tests in both FDRE Constitution and CCPR. It first  explores the types of terrorism 
related speech, which gives emphasis to incitement to terrorism and proceeds to analyze which 
type of speech is proscribed in the ATP. The final section looks into whether the limitation on 
freedom of expression under the ATP is Constitutional  and consistent with CCPR.
Methodology
The thesis employs the theoretical analysis of the pertinent laws of the FDRE Constitution, ATP, 
the Criminal Code and CCPR. These being the major sources of the study, United Nations 
Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions, Regional and International Conventions on 
human rights and  terrorism, Declarations of Principles within both the United Nations, African 
Unity and by other international non governmental organizations have been used. Moreover, 
concluding observations on state reports and decisions on individual communications  of the 
Human Rights Committee have been used in the thesis. 
 
Importantly, the provisions of FDRE Constitution and CCPR on freedom of expression have 
been joined in the discussion throughout the thesis. This is because Ethiopia is a party to CCPR, 
and the FDRE Constitution authorizes the interpretation of its provisions on human rights and 
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freedoms in line with CCPR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.1  Moreover, 
international treaties, which are adopted by Ethiopia form law of the land.2 Hence, the research 
question is approached from the harmonized interpretation of freedom of expression as 
guaranteed in both instruments.  
  
3
1 FDRE art 13(2)
2 Ibid art 9(3)
Chapter One- Definition of ‘terrorist acts’ in the ATP 
A study of the definition of ‘terrorism’ need to be the starting point  of a study of an anti terrorism 
legislation as this part lays down the basis for the application of the whole contents of that law. 
Specifically, the provision that proscribes encouragement of terrorism in the ATP refers to 
definition of terrorism in the same law.3 Accordingly, the study  of definition of terrorist acts in 
the ATP lays down the first and major step  in understanding of what is proscribed by 
encouragement of terrorism, which constitutes the main theme of this thesis.
 
This chapter starts with brief introduction of the international and regional conventions, which 
define ‘terrorism’ or specific aspects of ‘terrorism’. It then proceeds to the discussion of possible 
elements of  ‘terrorism’ and examines the definition of ‘terrorist acts’ under the ATP.
1.1 Definition of terrorism in general 
Lawyers, academics, national legislatures, regional organizations and international bodies 
notably the United Nations have produced a bewildering array of definitions of ‘terrorism’.4 
Today ‘terrorism’ is widely deployed in both political debate and legal discourse and particularly 
the legal meaning attributed to the concept is crucial in establishing and limiting the scope of 
serious criminal sanctions as well as the capacity of the government to infringe upon human 
rights. 5 
There are a number of international conventions on combating different forms of ‘terrorism’. 
Among others, the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages defines the crime of 
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3 ATP art 6
4 Golder (2004) p. 270
5 Ibid at 271
‘hostage taking’.6 Similarly, Article 2(1) of the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings defines the act of ‘terrorist bombings’.7  International Conventions on 
Suppression of Financing of Terrorism and Nuclear Terrorism also provide for their respective 
definitions of the specific acts of ‘terrorism’.8  Ethiopia acceded to the first two international 
conventions in 2003. There are also regional conventions in Americas, Africa and Europe which 
define terrorist acts. Specifically, the Organization of the African Union’s Convention on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism provides for the definition of ‘Terrorist Acts’.9 
Apart from these definitions in international and regional treaties, there are currently more than 
one hundred definitions of “terrorism”.10 These definitions vary and so far no objective universal 
definition of terrorism has been reached.11   Nonetheless, it  is argued that all definitions can be 
reduced to five basic structural elements namely: the perpetration of violence by whatever 
means; targeting of innocent civilians; with the intent to cause violence or with wanton disregard 
for its consequences; and for the purpose of causing fear, coercing or intimidating an enemy; in 
order to achieve some political, military, ethnic, ideological or religious goal.12 These elements 
are more or less recognized in one of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions.13  
Alternatively, definition of “terrorism” can be reduced to two elements: subjective element of a 
certain motivation or intention on the part of the perpetrators and an objective element of a crime 
of a certain scale. 14 These elements are what are normally  referred to as the mental and material 
5
6 CATH art 1
7 CSTB art 2(1)
8 CSFT art 2 & CSNT art 2
9 CPCT art 1(3)
10 Golder (2004) p.271 
11 Ibid
12 Tiefenbrun (2003) p.362 
13 S/RES/1566(2004)  
14 Walter (2003) p.27
elements of commission of crimes respectively. I have used the terms subjective/mental and 
objective/material elements interchangeably throughout this chapter. The subjective and 
objective elements roughly envisage the five basic structural elements of ‘terrorism‘ listed out 
above. What distinguishes crimes of terrorism from other ordinary crimes is, of course the 
special nature of the intention of the perpetrators, and a crime of large scale, which affects or is 
at least intended to affect the general public and the government.15 
Definitions of terrorism used to call for violence against persons to meet the material element of 
terrorism while the recent developments go in the direction of including violent and non violent 
but nevertheless destructive actions against public facilities. 16 On the other hand, while the 
intention of creating terror and fear within the population is an uncontroversial subjective 
element of the definition of ‘terrorist acts’, the degree of the influence on government decision-
making, which is necessary  to speak of terrorism, varies from country to country.17  Some 
definitions use “coercing” while others use “influencing” the government.18 The first  use refers 
to a restrictive approach in defining terrorism while the second one allows a broader application 
where otherwise accepted forms of public protest against government policies, such as large 
scale demonstrations, may too easily be labeled as terrorism.19
Generally, definitions of terrorism have both subjective/mental and objective/material elements 
that have to be met simultaneously if we are to talk about terrorist acts or crimes.
6
15 Ibid
16 Ibid
17 Ibid at 29
18 Ibid at 30
19 Ibid
1.2 Definition of “terrorist acts” in the ATP 
The ATP defines “terrorist acts” as:     
“Anyone intending to coerce the government, to intimidate the public or section of the public or 
to destabilize or destroy fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social institutions of 
the country, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, causes a 
person’s death or serious bodily injury; creates serious risk to the safety or health of the public or 
section of the public; commits kidnapping or hostage taking; causes serious damage to property; 
causes damage to natural resource, environment, historical or cultural heritages; endangers, 
seizes or puts under control, causes serious interference or disruption of any public service; or 
threatens to commit any  of these acts is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 15 years to 
life or with death.”20 
The subjective and objective elements of this definition are considered in the coming sections of 
this chapter.
1.2.1.Subjective / mental element
The first phrase of the definition of “terrorist acts” in the ATP provides for the kinds of intention 
of the perpetrators of “terrorist acts”.   The first subjective element is:
1 […]intending to coerce  the government, to intimidate the public or section of the public or;
The first consideration as regards the above phrase is the relation between the elements of 
“coercing the government” and “intimidation of the public or the section of the public”.  While 
the conjunction “or” is used in between the other subjective elements of the definition of 
“terrorist acts”, there is none in the case of the above two. Hence, the language used in both the 
Amharic and English versions does not imply an alternative approach. Other national “terrorism” 
definitions use “the intention to create fear among the population” and “the purpose of 
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20 ATP art 3
influencing or compelling the government or an international organization” alternatively.21 
Although, the two issues are closely related in terrorist acts, because the intimidation of the 
population is intended to serve as a means of coercing the government, the modern approach 
separates the issues that if the intention of intimidating the population is present, the intention of 
coercing the government is not a necessary additional requirement.22 
Coming back to the ATP’s definition, there is no indication in the language used that the 
elements of “coercing the government” and “intimidation of the public” are alternative elements 
of the definition of “terrorist acts”. Hence, the intimidation of the public or parts thereof must be 
used as a means of coercing the government if we are to speak of terrorist  act within the ATP’s 
framework, which makes the definition’s scope narrower on this regard.  Secondly, the definition 
uses the word “coerce”,  which calls for restrictive approach by making the threshold of the 
intention of the perpetrators higher. Finally, it is worth noting that for the purposes of the ATP 
“government” can mean the Ethiopian federal and regional governments, parts of these 
governments, a foreign government or an international organization.23 
2 […]intending to destabilize or destroy fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
institutions of the country,
Alternatively to the element of intimidation of the public to coerce the government, the ATP’s 
definition of “terrorist acts” provides for the intention of destabilizing or destroying fundamental 
political, constitutional, economic or social institutions of the country. However, none of the 
ATP’s provisions provide for nor make reference to others laws as to what are the 
“constitutional”, “political”, “economic” or “social” institutions of the country. Moreover, what 
is the standard for determining one institution as “fundamental” or not is left unregulated. 
Reference to the FDRE Constitution and Regional Constitutions as the case may be may help in 
determining the “constitutional” institutions of the country. Among others, legislative, judicial 
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21 Walter (2003) p.28
22 Ibid
23 ATP art 2(9)
and executive bodies at both federal and regional levels may constitute “constitutional” 
institutions of the country.  Are they “fundamental” enough to fall under the scope of the above 
element is left to the discretion of the court or the House of People’s Representatives (herein 
after referred to as the House) in case of involvement of terrorist organization. 
This approach tends to create an open ended element in defining terrorist acts by including 
ambiguous terms with no specific legal reference. This would further call for the arbitrary 
application of those elements to acts that might  not otherwise be conceived as terrorist acts, 
which would further, undermine the freedoms and rights of individuals in the choices they  make 
as members of a political party, in expressing their views and taking part in assembly  and more 
others. 
3 […]for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause
This is the last  condition attached to both the first and second mental elements of the definition 
of terrorist acts discussed above. The question this last condition tries to address is whether it is 
necessary  to speak of terrorism, that the perpetrators advance a political, religious or other 
ideological cause or not.24  The definition in the ATP is clear that the presence of a political, 
religious or ideological cause on the part of the perpetrators is a detrimental condition of the 
definition of terrorism in the ATP. The definition, hence, excludes those forms of acts which have 
no political, ideological or religious motivations from its ambit. 
1.2.2 Objective / material elements 
Assuming that the necessary subjective/mental elements of the definition of “terrorist acts” are 
fulfilled, what are the material or objective elements of the “terrorist acts” is the consideration 
under this section. The classical and uncontroversial element of terrorism has been the use of 
serious violence against persons, which only refers to such violence as a sufficient criterion to 
9
24 Walter (2003) p.27
fulfill the objective element of terrorism.25  However, there seems to be a development that 
broadens existing definition of terrorism into a direction of including violent and non violent but 
nevertheless destructive action against public facilities.26 
The ATP lists out material elements of “terrorist acts” some of which are defined in the 
“definitions” part of the ATP while the others are not. The relevant law in determining the exact 
limit and application of those undefined elements is hence, the Criminal Code.27 The objective 
elements of the definition of terrorism together with the relevant reference in the ATP or the 
Criminal Code as the case may be are briefly discussed herein under.  
    
Causing a person’s death or serious bodily injury: These acts are what are ordinarily  referred 
to as crimes of “homicide” and “serious bodily injury”. The specific material elements of these 
crimes can be defined by referring to the Criminal Code.28  
Creating serious risk to the safety or health of the public or section of the public: Crimes 
against public safety and public health are provided in the Criminal Code.29 Accordingly, the 
material elements of these crimes can be defined by  referring to the Criminal Code while how 
“serious” should be the risk to call the application of the ATP would be decided by the court or 
the House as the case may be.
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25 Ibid
26 Ibid
27 ATP art 36 (2)
28 CC arts 538 - 553 
29 Ibid  arts494-504 & 514-534
Committing kidnapping or hostage taking: The act is defined in the ATP as seizing or 
detaining and threatening to kill, to injure or to continue to detain a person in order to compel the 
government to do something as a condition for the release of the hostage.30 
Causing serious damage to property: The ATP defines “Property” as any asset whether 
corporeal or incorporeal or movable or immovable, and includes deeds and instruments 
evidencing title to or interest in such asset such as bank accounts.31  The “seriousness” of such 
damage to property is to be determined by a court or the House as the case may be. 
Causing damage to natural resource, environment, historical or cultural heritage: Neither 
the ATP nor the Criminal Code defines what constitutes crime of causing damage to natural 
resource, environment, historical or cultural heritage. As a result, specific regulations, or 
expertise definitions may be employed to define these terms.
Endangering, seizing or putting under control, causing serious interference or disruption of 
any public service: “Public service” is defined as electronic, information communication, 
transport, finance, public utility, infrastructure or other similar institutions or systems established 
to give public service.32  Like the other cases, the “seriousness” of the interference is to be 
determined by the concerned actors.  
Two important points that are related with the definition of terrorist acts should be noted. 
Threatening, planning, preparation, conspiracy and attempt to commit one of the above acts  are 
also punishable.33  A person who has been found guilty  of “terrorist acts” under the ATP is 
awaited with rigorous imprisonment from 15 years to life or capital punishment.34 
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30 ATP art 2(5)  
31 Ibid art 2(1)
32 Ibid art 2(7)
33 Ibid art 4 
34 Ibid art 3
The subjective and objective elements of terrorist  acts under ATP have been discussed in this 
chapter.  On the basis of the discussions, it  can be concluded that the definition of ‘terrorist acts‘ 
in the ATP indicates a restrictive application when it envisages the intention  to ‘coerce‘ instead 
of to ‘influence‘ the government. 
The inclusion of undefined and ambiguous or vague terms and phrases in the definition of 
‘terrorist acts’ in the ATP, however lead to a conclusion that the definition is broad, which allows 
arbitrary application of the provisions of the ATP. The danger is that an overly  vague or broad 
definition of ‘terrorism’ could lead to criminalization of conduct that does not constitute 
terrorism as such, which in turn poses a danger to the legitimate non violent and peaceful 
exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms.35 Similarly, the Human Rights Committee (herein 
after referred to as the Committee)  stressed that state party should adopt a more precise 
definition of terrorist acts so as to ensure that individuals will not be arbitrarily targeted on 
political, religious or ideological grounds.36 It  calls upon a state with vague definition of terrorist 
acts to address such vagueness in order to ensure that its application is limited to offenses that are 
indisputably terrorist offenses.37     
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35 A/63/337
36 CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5
37 CCPR/C/AUS/CO/5/CRP/1
Chapter Two: Freedom of Expression and its Limitation 
Clauses
The United Nations General Assembly in its very  first  session adopted Resolution 59(1), which 
asserts that freedom of information is a fundamental human right and the touchstone of all the 
freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.38 Given the explicit recognition of freedom 
of expression by the United Nation, it is no surprise that freedom of expression is subsequently 
guaranteed in international and regional instruments in second half of the 20th century. Indeed 
international and regional bodies have recognized that freedom of expression is of vital 
importance in any democratic society.39
Freedom of expression is guaranteed by international human rights instruments notably  the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as UDHR), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in regional human rights conventions of Africa, 
America and Europe. UDHR has arguably attained the status of customary  international law 
while Ethiopia is a party to CCPR and the African Convention on Human and Peoples‘ Rights. 
All these instruments to which Ethiopia is internationally bound recognize the right to freedom 
of expression.40  Moreover, the FDRE Constitution does not only  guarantees freedom of 
expression but also gives explicit recognition to the applicability  of these international norms at 
national level.41  Accordingly, discussion of freedom of expression within the Ethiopian Context 
will obviously call for the consideration of these constitutional and international undertakings of 
the country. However, considering all these instruments will be overambitious. Hence, the 
subsequent discussions on freedom of expression focus on the pertinent provisions of FDRE 
Constitution and CCPR. The next sections discuss substances and limitation clauses of freedom 
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38 Callamard (2008) p. 2
39 Ibid
40 UDHR art 19, CCPR art 19, ACHPR art 9
41 FDRE art 9(4) & 13(2)
of expression as incorporated in FDRE Constitution and CCPR. Freedom of expression and 
information is provided alongside with freedom of opinion and freedom of press in both CCPR 
and FDRE Constitution. As the scope of the thesis is limited to freedom of expression and 
information, the other substances of Article 29 and 19 of FDRE Constitution and CCPR 
respectively are excluded. Hence, the discussion below is confined to freedom of expression and 
information under both instruments.
2.1 Freedom of Expression- What is protected in FDRE Constitution and 
CCPR?
Freedom of opinion and expression is frequently termed as the core of the CCPR and the 
touchstone for all other rights guaranteed therein primarily because it symbolizes more than any 
other right the interdependence of the two large categories of human rights of the first generation 
which led into the naming of the covenant.42 Freedom of expression is not only  a fundamental 
human right, on its own and in its own right, but it is also a cornerstone right or an 
‘empowerment right’, one that enables other rights to be protected and exercised.43  Indeed, 
freedom of expression and opinion is linked to a number of other rights including freedom of 
association and assembly, right to property, minority  rights, rights related to health and education 
matters and freedom of religion.44 Importantly, freedom of expression forms a central pillar of a 
democratic framework through which all rights are promoted and protected, and the exercise of 
full citizenship  is guaranteed.45   The implication of such importance is that any  violation of 
freedom of expression goes beyond what is protected by  the freedom and can affect  the 
enjoyment of other rights and freedoms.  
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42 Nowak (2005) p. 438
43 Callamard (2008) p. 2 
44 Smith (2007) p. 267
45 Callamard (2008) p. 3
Both FDRE Constitution and CCPR provide that a person has the right to freedom of expression 
without any interference and the right includes freedom to seek, receive and impart  information 
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the forms of art, or 
through any media of one’s choice.46
Accordingly, Freedom of expression is protected with respect to “information and ideas of all 
kinds”.47 It can take many forms encompassing verbal, artistic and physical expression.48 Hence, 
every  communicable type of subjective idea and opinion, of value neutral news and information, 
of commercial advertising, art works, political commentary  regardless of how critical, 
pornography, etc is protected by freedom of expression, of course subject to permissible 
restrictions.49 In similar vein, anonymous publication of an opinion or information is protected.50 
Hence, freedom of expression extends beyond the mere verbalization of ideas.51  It further 
protects assemblies and demonstrations, all media of acoustic, visual, electronic and other 
communications i.e. in particular, radio and television, electronic media, film, photography, 
music, graphic and other arts.52
An important point worth noting here is that the mere dissemination of information and ideas 
must be distinguished from actions going beyond this that have to do with the active 
implementation of these ideas.53  In the case of latter, they are not protected by  freedom of 
expression without a necessary resort to the permissible clauses of freedom of expression.54
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46 FDRE art 29(2) & CCPR art 19(2)
47 Nowak (2005) p. 443
48 Smith (2007) p. 267
49 Nowak (2005) p. 443
50 Ibid
51 Smith (2007) p. 269
52 Nowak (2005) p. 445
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid
As regards forms of communications, freedom of expression envisages exchange of information 
and ideas intra and internationally.55  As the right is guaranteed “regardless of frontiers”, its 
enjoyment entails exchange of ideas and information of all kinds both intra and internationally. 
The right to seek information is generally understood to relate to all generally accessible 
information.56 What amounts to generally  accessible information as regards different persons is 
an issue here. In the context  of personal data and other specific information about a person, it is 
possible to assume that the individual concerned has a more extensive right to be informed of 
such data, in so far as this is not opposed by  pressing interests of secrecy on the part of the state 
or a private data bank whereas it  is debatable whether the public mandate of the press and 
electronic media to inform the public truthfully  of all events of interests implies a privileged 
right of journalists to seek information beyond what is generally accessible.57  
Though political expression may  arguably call for a better protection of freedom of expression, 
in both FDRE Constitution and CCPR the right protects information and ideas of all kinds 
invariably. Nonetheless, the Committee noted the importance of the right to seek and receive 
information on the conduct of political (parliamentary) affairs, which implies a privileged 
treatment of the media in the enjoyment of the right to information and stresses the positive 
obligation of states to protect against interference by private actors, in particular in relation to 
essentially public functions that have been delegated to private organizations.58 
Freedom of expression operates at both horizontal and vertical levels protecting an individual 
against arbitrary  interference in the enjoyment of the right by  both the state and other private 
individuals.59 Accordingly, freedom of expression entails obligation to respect and protect. State 
parties, are therefore, subject to the duty to prevent excessive media concentration with positive 
measures, such as with state financial assistance for the press and as regards electronic media 
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55 Smith (2007) p. 269
56 Nowak (2005) p. 446
57 Ibid
58 Nowak (2005) p. 448
59 Smith (2007)p. 268
states must above all provide for adequate public access.60  The horizontal effects are 
additionally emphasized by the reference to the special duties and responsibilities accompanying 
the exercise of freedom of expression and information.61
2.2 Limitation clauses of freedom of expression
As the case is within the context of all human rights and freedoms, it is an interplay  between the 
principle of freedom of expression and its limitation clauses, which determines the actual scope 
of the freedom.62  Accordingly, both international law and national constitutions provide for 
limitation of the right to freedom of expression to protect private and public interests.63 
Nonetheless, not every  restriction on freedom of expression is lawful.  International human rights 
conventions like CCPR provide for three part tests of “provided by law”, “in pursuance of 
legitimate aim” and “necessary” to assess the legitimacy  of a restriction on freedom of 
expression. 
Likewise, FDRE Constitution provides for limitation clauses on freedom of expression. It also 
provides for the requirements to be met while limiting freedom of expression. Unlike the 
substance of freedom of expression, FDRE Constitution’s limitation clause is different from 
CCPR’s limitation clauses, which calls for a different approach of discussion. Hence, I will first 
discuss the limitation clause on freedom of expression in CCPR and then FDRE Constitution. 
 2.2.1. Limitation clauses- CCPR       
At the start of the limiting paragraph of freedom of expression, it  is provided that  enjoyment of 
freedom of expression carries with it special duties and responsibilities.64It  further puts that 
freedom of expression can be subject to certain restrictions, which must be provided by law and 
are necessary  for respect of the rights and reputations of others and for the protection of national 
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60 Nowak (2005) p. 448
61 Ibid
62 Smith (2007) p. 271
63 EAO (2004) p. 41
64 CCPR art 19 (3)
security or of public order or of public health or morals.65  A closer analysis at  each element of 
the clause is made next.
The limitation clause of art  19(3) of CCPR emphasizes the special duties and responsibilities 
associated with the exercise of freedom of expression and information as the right to freedom of 
expression and freedom to seek information is capable of violating the rights of others66 
Moreover, as a consequence of the power associated with influencing public opinion, the 
exercise of freedom of expression tends towards concentration and monopolization, which leads 
to conflicts with the freedom of opinion and expression of others.67 Alongside the general duty  to 
disseminate information truthfully, accurately and impartially, these conflicts establish special 
responsibilities that impose upon the “opinion makers” an obligation not to abuse their power at 
the expense of others in addition to requiring state parties to take actions against excessive media 
concentration and to ensure diversity of opinion and general access to established opinions.68 
This being the special responsibilities and duties that enjoyment of freedom of expression entails, 
the different tests to be employed in assessing the legitimacy of any limitation on freedom of 
expression are discussed below.
It must be noted here that these tests are cumulative and the first  two are largely formal although 
compliance with domestic law will not necessarily suffice for the lawfulness standard while the 
third requirement demands strict scrutiny on behalf of Human Rights Committee.69 In addition to 
meeting the three tests, states should respect  principle of equality and non discrimination while 
limiting freedom of expression.70
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65 CCPR art 19 (3)
66 Nowak (2005) p. 459
67 Ibid
68 Ibid
69 Thorgeirsdottis (2005) p.29
70 SPLDP pl. 9 &15
i)Restriction must be provided by law 
Restrictions on freedom of expression and information must be set down in formal domestic 
legislation or an equivalent unwritten norm of common law and adequately specify the 
permissibility of a given interference by enforcement organs.71 A norm can be regarded as “law” 
for the purpose of restricting freedom of expression where it is formulated with sufficient 
precision to enable a person to foresee to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences, which a given action may entail.72  The level of precision required, of course 
depends to a considerable degree on the content of the instrument in issue, the field it is designed 
to cover, and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed.73   The degree of precision 
of the law is to be determined by  pertinent bodies on case by  case basis. Moreover, the “law” 
must adequately be accessible so that individuals have an adequate indication of how the law 
limits their rights.74  Finally and importantly, any criminal law proscription must also comply 
with the principle of non retroactivity and non discrimination.75 
ii)Interference must be necessary
Second to the test of legality, the restriction on freedom of expression must be necessary to attain 
one of the legitimate purposes listed therein whose necessity requirement implies that the 
restriction must be proportional in severity and intensity  to the purpose being sought and may  not 
become the rule but an exception, which should be interpreted narrowly.76 The restricting law 
must not  be so severe and intense to jeopardize the exercise of the right to freedom of expression 
itself.77  Limitations on freedom of expression must be necessary in the pursuit of a pressing 
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objective, and its impact on the right  strictly  proportional to the nature of that objective.78   A 
limitation that goes beyond what is necessary  in the circumstances is not proportional and hence 
unlawful.  
Since article 19(3) of CCPR does not provide for the criterion of necessity in a democratic 
society, the relevant criterion for evaluating the necessity of interference is not the principle of 
democracy  but  rather whether it was proportional in the given case.79  Nevertheless, the 
Committee, when applying the proportionality  test of art 19(3) in individual cases, regularly 
refers to freedom of expression and information as cornerstone in any  free and democratic 
society and hence implies that “democracy” is one of the criterions.80 Moreover, the Siracusa 
Principles on limitation and derogations of CCPR (herein after referred to as the Siracusa 
Principles) provide that the ‘in a democratic society’ criterion should be considered as an 
additional qualification of the limitation clauses.81 The Principles further recognize that though 
there is no single model of democratic necessity, a society which recognizes and respects the 
human rights set  forth in the United Nations Charter and the UDHR may be viewed as meeting 
this definition.82  Regionally, the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa 
provides for the additional condition of ‘necessary in a democratic society’.83     
Hence, if necessity in a democratic society is one of the conditions applied in determining the 
proportionality of a measure, a brief discussion of the standard as applied in the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights (European Court) is necessary to understand how the 
condition is applied, what it means and what its application entails.
The European Court noted that the word “necessary” within the meaning of art 10(2) of 
European Convention of Human Rights is not synonymous with “indispensable”, neither has it 
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the flexibility of such expressions as “admissible”, “ordinary”, “useful”, “reasonable” or 
“desirable” but it must imply a pressing social need.84 
Though the European Court does not employ all of them at once, the proportionality  analysis 
usually  consists of the following three sub principles, suitability (the limiting measure must be 
capable of achieving the legitimate) aim pursued, necessity  (the limiting measure must be the 
least restrictive means to achieve the relevant purpose) and proportionality  in the narrow sense 
(there must be a reasonable balance between the limiting measure and the aim pursued)85
Hence, by the necessity test, the limiting measure is weighed whether it  is the effective way  of 
pursuing the legitimate aim in addition to requirement that it must be the least  restrictive 
measure. Moreover, there must be a causal link between the limiting measure and the pursuance 
of the legitimate aim. 
iii) Purposes of interference 
In principle, limitation grounds of human rights and freedoms are listed exhaustively, hence 
additional limitation ground cannot be introduced to the list.86  The purposes of interference in 
limiting freedom of expression are respect of the rights and reputations of others, national 
security, public order, public health or public morals.87 Each permissible ground of interference 
is briefly discussed herein under. 
a) Respect of the rights and reputations of others
This limitation ground raises the classic human rights conflict between freedom of expression 
and protection of privacy.88  States parties, hence, are not only  entitled to restrict freedom of 
expression, but also bound to provide statutory protection against intentional infringement on 
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honor and reputation by untrue assertions.89 The protection of the rights and reputation of others 
may be ensured by measures of criminal, civil and or administrative law of which the greatest 
importance, though, is possessed by those special measures provided for in the media laws of 
most states.90 
In protection of rights and reputations of others, the principle of proportionality must be strictly 
observed since there is otherwise the danger that freedom of expression could be undermined; 
particularly in the political arena, not every attack on the good reputation of others must be 
sanctioned, since freedom of expression and information especially  freedom of the media would 
otherwise be stripped off their fundamental importance for the process of formation of political 
opinion.91 Hence, a limitation on freedom of expression, should not be used to protect   the state 
and its officials from public criticism and opinion.92
b) National security   
It is argued that restrictions based on national security  are permissible only  in serious cases of 
political or military  threat to the entire nation.93 This ground should not be invoked to prevent 
merely local or relatively isolated threats to law and order.94 Examples of limitations on freedom 
of expression on national security claims include situations of gathering of ‘intelligence’, the 
publication of ‘memoirs’ of former intelligence personnel and military information.95 Publication 
and dissemination of a direct call to violent overthrow of the government in an atmosphere of 
political unrest or propaganda of war within the meaning of art  20(1)  of CCPR as well falls 
within this ground of restriction.96
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Many governments have a tendency to invoke protection of national security to justify far 
reaching restrictions on freedom of expression of opposition groups, politicians and critical 
media.97 It seems to overcome such tendency the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, 
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (hereinafter referred to as Johannesburg 
Principles) require that while resorting to the ground national security, governments should 
demonstrate that the expression is intended to incite imminent violence, it  is likely to incite such 
violence and there is a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the 
likelihood or occurrence of such violence.98     
c) Public order 
Public order may  be defined as the sum of rules which ensure the functioning of society or the 
set of fundamental principles on which society is founded where respect for human rights is part 
of it.99 The term public order covers licensing of broadcasting cinema or television enterprises, 
procurement and dissemination of confidential information and endangering the impartiality  of 
the judiciary, certain limitations on freedom of expression by members of security  forces or by 
officials, as well as on the freedom of information of prisoners.100
It is argued that since public order may otherwise lead to a complete undermining of the freedom 
of expression and information, strict requirements must be placed on the necessity  of a given 
statutory restriction and that the minimum requirements flowing from a common international 
standard for this human right, which is so essential to the maintenance of democracy, may not be 
set too low.101
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d) Public health or public morals
Public morals are in some ways ephemeral, evolving with changes in government and societal 
progress leading to no universal standard of public morality.102 The Committee stressed that there 
is no universally applicable standard of public moral consequently, in this respect; a certain 
margin of discretion must be accorded to the responsible national authorities.103  However, the 
concerned state must demonstrate that the limitation in question is essential to the maintenance 
of respect for fundamental values of the community.104   
On the other hand, the protection of public health as regards limitations on freedom of expression 
is of only minor practical relevance in the context of freedom of expression and information and 
examples on this ground include prohibition of misleading publication on health threatening 
materials or prohibition of advertising of tobacco, medicines and the like.105In applying this 
limitation ground, states are advised to give due regard to the regulations of the World Health 
Organization.106
e) Prohibition of propaganda of war- additional legitimate ground?
  Article 19(3) of CCPR provides the manner in which freedom of expression can legitimately be 
limited. This limitation paragraph and indeed the whole provision is followed by Article 
20 ,which lays down for the prohibition of propaganda of war and advocacy  of hatred.  The 
ordinary  case for rights and freedoms is that  they first set the substances of what is protected by 
the right or freedom and then list out  the manner in which that right can be restricted, which 
ultimately  set the scope the right or freedom in question. However, the case for Article 20 is 
different, which calls for a further elaboration of what it is meant to govern, what called for its 
inclusion in the CCPR. In search of such elaboration resort to legislative background of Article 
24
102 Ibid at 466
103 Ibid
104 SPLDP  pl. 27
105 Nowak (2005) p. 466
106 SPLDP  pl. 26
20, teachings of international human rights scholars and the case law of Human Rights 
Committee is necessary.     
 The historical background of Article 20 reveals that it was primarily  intended to put an 
obligation upon states to employ  preventive measures on the root causes like war that threaten 
rights of individuals notably the rights to life and equality.107 The fact that the drafting of the 
two international human rights covenants, particularly CCPR was at  the wake of the end of the 
Second World War, highlighted the importance of the inclusion of an article that imposes an 
obligation upon states to combat the root causes of acts that endanger fundamental human rights 
and freedoms.108 
  The formulation of Article 20 is not to set out a right but put limitation to other human rights.109 
The fact that Article 20 follows Article 19 of CCPR seems to indicate that the prohibition of 
propaganda of war and advocacy  of hatred is only  targeted to restrict freedom of expression.110 
Nonetheless, Manfred Nowak argues that  it is a limitation to other rights such as freedoms of 
religion, association and assembly in addition to its particular relation with freedom of 
expression.111 Hence, in case of conflict of human rights, the prohibition of discrimination and 
the right to life in CCPR are given certain priority by the operation of the rule that prohibits 
propaganda of war and advocacy of hatred if Article 20 is understood as a special, positive duty 
to guarantee the first two central provisions of the CCPR.112 The provision is unique from other 
limitation clauses in CCPR in that it does not only authorize interference but  also requires state 
parties to provide for corresponding restriction.113 
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 The case law of the Human Rights Committee indicates two approaches towards treating actions 
that fall within the ambit of Article 20 of CCPR. It first gave a decision which implies the 
treatment of the provision not as a limitation provision but as an absolute prohibition of 
specified acts, which does not call for the observance of the different tests employed in 
determining the legitimacy of a given restriction.114  The Committee revised its approach in 
Ross v Canada, where it decides that restrictions that fall within scope of Article 20 must  also 
be permissible under Article 19(3), which lays down requirements for determining whether 
restrictions on expression are permissible.115 
  Nowak argues that since legal prohibitions under Article 20 are to be interpreted in conformity 
with the restrictions tests under Article 19(3) , the former merely  sets forth additional specific 
purposes for interference, which might have easily  been included under the latter.116 He further 
illustrates his position by examples where prohibition of propaganda of war can be necessary 
for the protection of national security, and prohibition of advocacy of hatred can be used for the 
respect of the rights of others and for the protection of public order.117
  Hence, the relation between Article 19(3) and Article 20 as argued by  Manfred Nowak and as 
suggested by the decision of the Committee clearly  indicates that state parties need to show that 
the restriction on freedom of expression within the ambit of Article 20 is consistent with the 
limitation tests set out in Article 19(3) of the Covenant.  
  Having concluding that  Article 20 forms an additional legitimate ground of restricting freedom 
of expression, what is actually meant by propaganda of war and advocacy of hatred will be 
discussed briefly. 
 Propaganda means only intentional, well aimed influencing of individuals by employing various 
channels of communication, which are capable of reaching a large circle of persons to 
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disseminate, above all, incorrect or exaggerated allegations of fact in addition to negative or 
simplistic value judgements whose intensity is at least comparable to that of provocation, 
instigation or incitement.118The object and purpose of prohibition of propaganda of war, hence 
is not to prohibit academic studies of questions of defense or security policy but  rather to forbid 
propagandist incitement roughly  comparable to that practiced in the Third Reich.119  State 
obligations here are to ensure, to fulfill and protect at the horizontal level primarily in addition 
to abstaining from engaging into official state propaganda.120 
 The word ‘war’ relates to those forms of propaganda threatening or resulting in the act of 
aggression or breach of peace contrary to the United Nations Charter, which does not affect the 
right of individuals or collective self defense guaranteed in Article 51 of the Charter and other 
measures consistent with chapter seven or the right to self determination and independence.121 
Moreover, internal civil wars are outside the scope of Article 20(1) unless they develop into an 
international conflict.122However, states can limit expression that relates to propaganda of civil 
war on the legitimate ground of national security under Article 19(3) by meeting all the 
restriction requirements provided therein.123 The offense of propaganda of war does not require 
that a war actually take place and it is only  of minor importance as to when the armed 
aggression reaches the degree of intensity constituting war.124 
  In prohibiting propaganda of war states may  employ civil, public and criminal law restrictions, 
which should be consistent with the limitation clauses in Article 19(3).125   
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  The second paragraph of Article 20 prohibits advocacy of hatred. This prohibition is related to 
‘incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’.126  It does not require states to prohibit 
advocacy of hatred in private that instigates acts of racial or religious discrimination.127            
  The limitation clauses of freedom of expression, which are primarily governed by Article 19(3) 
and in some particular cases by Article 20 of CCPR, which should be read in line with the 
former have been discussed above. The three tests of ascertaining the legitimacy  of restrictions 
on freedom of expression has been elaborated. The next section considers the limitation clauses 
of freedom of expression as provided in the FDRE Constitution. 
  2.2.3 Limitation clauses- FDRE Constitution 
  A couple of important and inter related issues whose conclusion are premises for the discussion 
in this and chapter three of the thesis and indeed to the whole theme of the research need to be 
addressed at this point. The discussion of freedom of expression within the Ethiopian context is 
being made within the framework of both FDRE Constitution and CCPR. This is because 
Ethiopia is a party  to CCPR and its Constitution provides that fundamental freedoms and rights 
therein are to be interpreted in line with CCPR128 in addition to stipulating that international 
treaties signed by Ethiopia form laws of the country.129 
 However, one need to address the related issues of interpretation that arise as a result of the 
above approach. The issues of interpretation are hence, whether interpretation of the FDRE 
Constitution in line with CCPR should be intended to create a narrower scope of the right to 
freedom of expression by including additional limitation grounds, which are not provided for in 
the first  but in the second instrument or to create a wider scope of the right to freedom of 
expression by increasing the number of the tests that the government should observe while 
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limiting freedom of expression though the additional test is not provided in FDRE Constitution 
but CCPR. 
In addressing the first issue Article 5(2) of CCPR provides for the principle that the rights 
therein merely represent a minimum standard and that the combined effect of various human 
rights conventions, domestic norms and customary international law may  not be interpreted to 
the detriment of the individual but ensure the greatest possible substantive and procedural 
rights.130 Accordingly, it is not possible to interpret the FDRE Constitution in a way to give the 
individual a lesser right  where the scope of the right provided therein is better than that of 
CCPR counter part. Additional grounds of limiting freedom of expression widen the pool of 
reasons where a government can legitimately limit freedom of expression, which in effect 
means lesser protection of the right. Hence, it is not permissible to include additional limitation 
grounds to the list of Article 29(6) of FDRE Constitution by invoking that they are found in 
CCPR.
FDRE Constitution only provides for the tests of ‘provided by law’ and ‘in pursuance of 
legitimate aims’ and not for the test of ‘necessity’. The second issue is hence, whether by way 
of interpretation we can include the ‘necessity’ test to the other two tests in FDRE Constitution. 
There is no specific stipulation as regards the treatment of the second issue in the CCPR. 
However, the acontrario reading of Article 5(2) of CCPR implies that where it recognizes a 
better scope of the right, state parties are unquestionably required to comply with their 
international human rights commitment despite their national law stipulation. Hence, though the 
test of ‘necessity‘ is not provided in Article 29(6) of FDRE Constitution,  it should be included 
by way of interpretation primarily  because Ethiopia is a party to CCPR and is expected to 
guarantee a better scope of freedom of expression and because the Constitution clearly 
authorizes such interpretation.   
On the basis of these premises a discussion of the three test of limiting freedom of expression in 
FDRE Constitution are discussed below.   
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i) Test of ‘provided by law’
Freedom of expression, according to FDRE Constitution, can only be limited through laws, 
which should be guided by the principle that freedom of expression and information cannot be 
limited on account of the content or effect of the point of view expressed.131  
The internationally accepted test of “provided by law” is, therefore provided in Article 29(6) of 
FDRE Constitution. What exactly is meant by this test has been discussed in the previous sub 
section where limitation clauses in CCPR as regards freedom of expression are thoroughly 
discussed. The discussion there holds true for  the FDRE Constitution. 
 ii) The test of ‘in pursuance of legitimate aims’
The legitimate aims in limiting freedom of expression are protection of well-being of the youth, 
honor and reputation of individuals, prohibition of any propaganda of war and the public 
expression of opinion intended to injure human dignity.132 These legitimate aims for limiting 
right to freedom of expression are exhaustively listed.
Except for the ground of protection of honor and reputation of others the other limitation 
grounds in Article 29(6) of FDRE Constitution  are not clearly  found in CCPR Article 19(3). 
However, considering that Article 20 of CCPR provides for additional limitation grounds to 
Article 19(3) of the same, the grounds of prohibition of propaganda of war and public opinion 
intended to injure human dignity in Article 29(6) of FDRE Constitution can be equated with the 
limitation grounds in Article 20 of CCPR. Having stated this, the grounds of restricting freedom 
of expression in FDRE Constitution are discussed below. 
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a) Well being of the youth 
The well being of the youth is unique ground of limiting freedom of expression, which is only 
found in the FDRE Constitution and not CCPR. This substantially hampers the discussion of this 
ground as there exists rare literature. What is worse is that the well being is attached to youth 
instead of the child. In the later case, reference to international and constitutional rules on rights 
of the child could help in understanding the ground. Age range of youth varies from one country 
to another. Nonetheless, being youth starts before one gets out of childhood, meaning before one 
turns eighteen. Hence, well being of the child can be part of well being of the youth.
Due to source constraints, I have decided to limit the scope of this ground to ‘well being of the 
child’. Though I fear that this will only  address parts of ‘well being of the youth’, I am left with 
no other feasible alternative.
FDRE Constitution provide for the protection of children from exploitive practices, which may 
be hazardous to their education, health or wellbeing.133 Moreover, the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child refers to the well being of the child.134  Furthermore, it  calls for the promotion of 
social, spiritual and moral well being of the child.135 On the basis of these references, it may be 
concluded that well being of the child includes physical, social, spiritual or moral well being of 
the child. 
Given the assumptions that children are dependent, innocent, incomplete, incompetent and above 
all vulnerable special child protection measures are necessary.136 Hence, in the context of this 
discussion, an expression that jeopardize the physical, social, spiritual and moral well being of 
the child can be limited on the basis of this legitimate ground. Examples of expression that may 
endanger the well being of the child include pornography, indoctrination and brain washing. 
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   b) Honor and reputations of others
The objective of this limitation ground is to protect  the right  to human dignity, honor and 
reputation of individuals.137 An individual  has the right to the free development of her person 
in a manner compatible with the rights of the rights of other in addition to be recognized 
everywhere as a person.138  
Honor and reputation of others as recognized in FDRE Constitution is hence, another ground of 
limiting freedom of expression.   
c) Prohibition of propaganda of war
Prohibition of propaganda of war was argued as a specific additional limitation ground of 
limiting freedom of expression in addition to all those provided in Article 19(3) of CCPR. In 
similar vein, FDRE Constitution provides it as one of the legitimate grounds for limiting 
freedom of expression. 
In the previous sub section what is meant  by the prohibition of propaganda of war has been 
discussed. It  was argued that the prohibition of propaganda of war is necessary for the 
protection of national security. In other words, though the FDRE Constitution fails to provide 
for the ground of national security in clear manner, it has implicitly included this ground when 
it prohibits propaganda of war.
d) Public opinion intended to injure human dignity
Despite the frequent use of the concept in human rights discourse, human dignity  has remained 
fluid without a single agreeable definition.139 Nonetheless, it is argued it connotes an intrinsic 
worth of human being.140Hence, human dignity within the context of exercise of freedom of 
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expression can be used to restrict those speech that target the inherent worth of human beings.141 
Statements that demean and humiliate individuals or groups and dissemination of negative 
stereotypes of groups and teachings that particular races, ethnic groups or religions hold 
‘ridiculous’ or dangerous views are some examples of statements that may injure human 
dignity.142 
On the other hand, FDRE Constitution provides for the prohibition of public opinion intended to 
injure human dignity alongside with prohibition of propaganda of war.143The prohibition covers 
only public statements. It seems that this ground is replica of Article 20 of CCPR. It follows, 
prohibition of public opinion intended to injure human dignity is in effect prohibiting advocacy 
of hatred. On the basis of arguments of Nowak, such prohibition is necessary for the protection 
of public order and honor and reputation of others.144The fact that human dignity has been 
recognized as part of right to honor and reputation in the FDRE Constitution supports this 
interpretation. 
Hence, prohibition of public opinion intended to injure human dignity in Article 29(6) of FDRE 
Constitution is in effect protecting honor and reputation of others and public order. Importantly, 
the ground of public order is included to the legitimate grounds of limiting freedom of 
expression in FDRE Constitution, though the Constitution does not clearly provide for it. As it 
has been noted in the previous discussion, public order comprises of fundamental principles upon 
which a democratic society committed to equality and non discrimination is founded. Given the 
above interpretation, rights of equality  and non discrimination are implicitly  envisaged by the 
ground of public order.    
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    iii) The test of ‘necessity’  
The test of necessity, which should be met alongside with the first and second tests, is not found 
in the limitation clause of FDRE Constitution. However, it was argued and concluded that the 
test of ‘necessity’ must be met while limiting freedom of expression when FDRE Constitution 
is interpreted in line with CCPR. The discussion on the test within the context of CCPR is 
pertinent for the understanding of the test to be employed in weighing limitation of freedom of 
expression in the FDRE Constitution. In order to avoid repetition, readers are advised to refer to 
the previous discussions on the test in the preceding section.   
Generally, the substances of freedom of expression as recognized in FDRE Constitution and 
CCPR have been discussed in this chapter. The limitation tests that need to be fulfilled when 
states limit freedom of expression in both instruments have also been dealt with. The next 
chapter will analyze the ATP proscription of encouragement of terrorism in light of these tests.
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Chapter Three: Proscription of Encouragement of terrorism 
in the ATP- Permissible Limitation on Freedom of 
Expression? 
“Propaganda has long been the hand maiden of violence: inciting, justifying and naturalizing it; 
ploughing the ground for violence by softening our psychological defenses to it and desensitizing 
us to its brutalizing effects of and much of the power of propaganda stems from what is left 
unspoken: the vast possibilities of imagination triggered by clever, subtle and insidious 
emotional provocation.”145 
The need to put restrictions on speech that incites terrorist acts is justified on a couple of reasons. 
The first is criminalization of incitement is an early measure against the materialization of the 
target conduct when it is particularly  harmful, in this case terrorist acts.146 The second reason for 
criminalizing incitement to terrorist acts may be that it  has a particular qualitative contribution to 
the materialization of the terrorist acts, namely  that incitement is a sine qua non for the 
materialization of the target conduct.147  
Given the prominency of terrorist acts in the 21st century  and due to the fact that incitement to 
terrorism is a strategy commonly  used by  terrorist organizations to further support their cause 
and call for violent action, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1624 (herein after 
referred to as the Resolution) identified it as a conduct which is contrary to the purposes of the 
United Nations and called on states to adopt specific measures to prohibit and prevent it.148 In the 
words of the Resolution, “incitement  acts motivated by extremism and intolerance poses a 
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serious and growing danger to the enjoyment of human rights, threatens the social and economic 
development of all states, undermines global stability and prosperity”.149   
Ethiopia is one of the most recent  states to criminalize encouragement of terrorism. This chapter 
would first explore the types of terrorism related speech and proceed to identify  what is 
proscribed in the anti terrorism proclamation. The last section would analyze if this proscription 
is consistent with the permissible limitation clauses of freedom of expression under both the 
FDRE Constitution and CCPR. 
3.1 Types of terrorism related speech  
3.1.1 Terrorist threats 
Not all terrorist threats call for legal regulation but  only those “true threats”, which encompass 
those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals where the 
speaker need not actually  intend to carry out the threat.150 A prohibition on true threats, hence, 
protects individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that  fear engenders, in 
addition to protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.151 
Many states around the world proscribe terrorist threats though there is a discrepancy  as regards 
the adjective “true” in qualifying terrorist threats.152 
3.1.2. Incitement to terrorism
The Resolution points out incitement to terrorism as the most dangerous act that goes against the 
purposes of the United Nations and called upon states to criminalize incitement to terrorism in 
their respective domestic laws but  only repudiates acts of glorification of terrorism.153 Incitement 
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to terrorism is a commonly  used strategy of terrorist organizations in furthering their cause and 
call for violent actions.154  The call for the prohibition of incitement to terrorist acts by the 
Security Council does not differentiate what types of sanctions should be applicable. Nor does it 
provide for the definition of incitement to terrorism. 
Apart from the Resolution, none of the universal terrorism related conventions explicitly requires 
the prohibition of incitement to terrorism.155  Nevertheless, the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and freedoms while countering 
terrorism has expressed the view that  the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism (hereinafter referred to as CECPT) provision on provocation of terrorist acts represents 
the best  practice in defining the proscription of incitement to terrorism.156  Accordingly, in 
determining the definition of incitement or provocation to terrorism a resort  is made to the this 
European instrument.
The CECPT defines provocation to commit a terrorist  offence as the distribution, or otherwise 
making available, of a message to the public, with intent  to incite the commission of a terrorist 
offence, where such conduct, whether or not  directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a 
danger that one or more of such offences may be committed.157 This provision has a number of 
elements, which are discussed below. 
a) Terrorist acts
The prohibition of incitement to terrorism is related to terrorist acts, which are defined in  either 
national or international instruments, in this case the European Framework Decision on 
Combating Terrorism.158Accordingly, the definition of terrorist acts in the relevant instrument to 
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which the prohibition of incitement refers to is one of the main elements of the definition of 
incitement to terrorism. 
b) Content of the speech
No doubt that incitement includes a direct call to engage in a terrorist act while it is not clear 
whether it should include other speech such as glorification of terrorism.159 It  is argued that the 
weight exerted by the inciters on the incites lies not on the issuance of direct orders but in sowing 
and nurturing in their audience the ideological foundations from which the willingness to act 
emerges.160 That is should incitement include speech which is thought to have some potential to 
incite criminal action, but which may be less targeted in message or audience and less obviously 
a proximate cause of actual criminal acts.161 
The Resolution clearly  does not encompass glorification of terrorism. Moreover, the report of the 
Secretary General of the United Nations on the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism (hereinafter referred to as the Report) expressly reject the 
prohibition of glorification.162 Hence, though these instruments are not legally binding it can be 
concluded within the United Nation framework, only incitement not glorification is called to be 
prohibited.
On the contrary, the European definition above envisages glorification of terrorism, that includes 
indirect incitement and incitement to terrorism.163  Glorification of terrorism or which is 
otherwise referred to as indirect incitement includes presentation of a terrorist offence as 
necessary  and justified and dissemination of messages praising the perpetrator of an attack, the 
denigration of victims, calls for funding of terrorist organizations or other similar behavior.164  
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c) An act of communication 
The provocation to terrorism must constitute an act of communication.165 Incitement to terrorism 
is only proscribed only as regards public communication of the provocation , which targets a non 
specific audience within both the Resolution and the CECPT context.166Hence, the incitement 
should be directed at a non specific audience rather than a private communication to an 
individual or a specifically defined group.167However, the determination of whether a specific 
speech was public or private must take into account the totality  of the circumstances, such as the 
number of members of the public involved, and the openness and accessibility  of the place or the 
speech.168
d) Objective probability of harm
The other element of the definition of provocation of terrorism in CECPT is the  requirement of 
an additional objective danger that the author’s conduct will incite terrorism.169 There must be 
some risk of resulting harm as a consequence of the inciting statement.170  The scope of the 
speech that may be prohibited and the gravity  of the offense or the social interest which it 
protects are the two parameters in determining the threshold of the probability  of harm.171 
Moreover, the objective probability of harm need to be assessed by reference to the nature of the 
author of the addressee as well as the context in which the statement was made.172 Indeed there 
need to exist a causal link between the public expression of support for terrorist offenses or 
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terrorist groups and the commission of terrorist offenses so a person could be liable of 
provocation of terrorism.173 
e) The requirement of intention 
Intention to bring about the commission of a terrorist act is a condition for prohibiting speech 
that incites terrorism.174 Accordingly, an act of incitement  to terrorism without an accompanying 
intention on the part of the perpetrator does not entail liability under anti terrorism laws. In 
assessing the context the European Court of Human Rights takes into account the ‘the problems 
linked to prevention of terrorism’ and the decision of the court once suggested that the above 
may imply  that statements, which at first sight, do not incite violence, can nevertheless be held to 
do so in the context of a serious terrorist campaign.175
Given the proportionality  risk that limitation of rights involves the last two conditions of the 
existence of objective probability of harm and the intention on the part of the perpetrator 
attached as regards incitement to terrorism operate as proportionality check.176  Accordingly, 
states are expected to comply with these two conditions while framing their national laws 
proscribing incitement to terrorism.177  They also should take due care in setting boundary 
between the indirect incitement to commit acts of terrorism on the one hand whilst safeguarding 
the ‘legitimate voicing of criticism’ on the other.178
3.1.3 Glorification of terrorism  
Martin Scheinin, a special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedom while countering terrorism expressed his concern over the trend to move 
beyond actual incitement, in order to criminalize the glorification or apology of terrorism or the 
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publication of information that may be useful in the commission of acts of terrorism.179 Recall 
that the Resolution only repudiates glorification of terrorism while the subsequent Report clearly 
prohibits its proscription.
As noted above, glorifying statements are those statements which praise, support, or justify 
terrorism as opposed to inciting terrorism.180 These statements may not go as far as inciting or 
promoting the commission of terrorism but only  justify or praise past terrorist acts.181 
Statements that glorify or promote terrorist  acts might offend sensibilities of individual persons 
and society, particularly  victims of terrorists’ acts; it is however argued that laws should not be 
imposed to restrict such kind of statements.182  The joint declaration of experts of freedom of 
expression explains that incitement should be understood as a direct call to engage in terrorism, 
with the intention that  this should promote terrorism, and in a context in which the call is directly 
casually responsible for increasing the actual likelihood of a terrorist  act occurring.183 The same 
position is taken in the Report of the Secretary General.184
All the above arguments and approaches reveal that  proscribing apology  or glorification of 
terrorism is not or at least should not be permissible as such restriction would be not be 
proportional restriction of freedom of expression. 
3.2 Types of speech proscribed in the ATP  
Above the different categories of terrorism related speeches have been explained. It  has been 
pointed out that arguably almost all forms of terrorism related speech do not enjoy legal 
protection. As far as the Resolution and the Report are concerned only incitement not 
glorification of terrorism are called to be sanctioned. Whereas the CECPT definition of 
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provocation of terrorism envisages an indirect provocation of terrorist acts that may include 
glorification of terrorism. However, it may be concluded that there exists a consensus as regards 
limitation of freedom of expression and political dissent by  proscribing those statements that 
incite others to commit terrorist acts. 
Be this as it may, the Ethiopian government introduced the first anti terrorism law of the country 
partly to respond to the international call for enactment of domestic anti terrorism law. The same 
holds true for the proscription of encouragement of terrorism and other terrorism related speech 
under the ATP. The relevant sections as regards terrorism related speech are Articles 3(7) and 6 of 
the ATP that proscribe threats of terrorist acts and encouragement of terrorism respectively.  On 
the other hand, whether glorification or apology of terrorism is actually  criminalized in the ATP 
or not would be identified after the analysis of the provision on encouragement of terrorism.
3.2.1 Threats of terrorist acts
As regards terrorist threats, it has been argued above that  only  true threats should be proscribed. 
National courts at first instance and international organs like the Committee have the authority in 
determination of the truthfulness of terrorist threats that should call for lawful restriction on such 
speech.
Coming back to the ATP, terrorist threats are proscribed. After defining what terrorist acts are, the 
ATP proscribes terrorist threats.185  This stipulation fails to put the adjective “true” making it 
broad as regards its application. Therefore on the basis of this provision any terrorist threat, 
which can be true or false that is communicated by anyone under any circumstances would entail 
liability. So far no cases have been brought before the Ethiopian courts as regards terrorist  threats 
leaving us with no practical guidance as to the application of this provision. However, it can be 
concluded that given the limited power of  courts in interpretation of criminal laws, the chance 
where courts apply the adjective “true” where the law does not explicitly provide for it is very 
low. This leaves the provision on terrorist threats  broad that  can be applied to anyone 
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irrespective of the personal characters and the circumstances under which the communication 
was made.
3.2.2 Encouragement of terrorism
The stipulation on encouragement of terrorism defines the act as:
“[…] publishing or causing the publication of a statement that is likely to be understood by some 
or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement 
or other inducement to them to the commission or preparation or instigation of an act  of 
terrorism[…]”186 
The stipulation can be reduced into a number of elements, which are closely analyzed below. 
- The first is an act of communication whereby a statement is published or caused to be 
published. 
What exactly is meant by ‘statement’ and what is the scope of the term ‘publication’ as used in 
this stipulation need some clarification. The ATP does not define both terms. Hence, resort to 
other definitions of other countries is necessary. Accordingly, a statement includes any 
communication of any description, including a comment without words constituting of sounds or 
images or both.187  On the other hand, publication includes providing electronically  any service 
by means of which the public have access to the statement, which extends to internet service 
providers and those who run websites where people can post statements.188  As regards the 
personal liability, the wording of the above stipulation indicates both the publisher and the author 
of the communication who caused the publication of the encouraging statement are liable.
- The second element of the proscription of its reference to “acts of terrorism”.
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Acts of terrorism are defined in Article 3 of the ATP, which has been the theme of the first 
chapter of this thesis. According to the definition in the ATP, acts of terrorism are committed 
where an individual or a group with the intention of advancing a political, ideological or 
religious cause coerces the government, intimidates the public or section of the public or 
destabilizes or destroys the fundamental political, constitutional or economic or social 
institutions of the country by committing acts that range from those targeting against life of 
persons to property  and other interests of the country, foreign state or international 
organization.189 Recall the conclusion in the first chapter that  this definition is broad, which does 
not only cover a number of acts that can be regulated by criminal or other laws but also contains 
vague, ambiguous and undefined terms. Hence, a statement that relates to the vaguely and 
ambiguously defined terrorist acts in the ATP and which meets the other requirements of the 
definition of encouragement of terrorism in the ATP is proscribed.
- The third element is that the statement should be communicated to the public.
The stipulation above provides that the publication of the statement should be targeted to some or 
all of members of the public. Hence, private communication of statements that may otherwise 
constitute encouragement of terrorism fall out side the scope of the stipulation. 
- The fourth element is that the published statement is likely to be understood as a direct or 
indirect encouragement or other inducement of terrorism. 
The objective probability  of harm requirement calls for causal link between the encouraging 
statement and the danger of commission, preparation or instigation of terrorist acts. It  considers 
the nature of the author and of the addressee, as well as the context in which the offense is 
committed.190  The above stipulation, however only covers the probable understanding of the 
addressees in relation to the communication, which is one aspect of the “objective” requirement. 
Accordingly, an “objective” assessment of the danger that the communication entails in 
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encouraging or inducing commission, or preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism fails to 
be the element of the above stipulation.
A related point, which is worth noting here is that the stipulation covers  encouraging statements 
to the commission, preparation and instigation of terrorist acts. This coupled with the absence of 
an “objective” assessment of the danger that the encouraging statement entails allows a broad 
application of the stipulation on encouragement of terrorism. 
- The fifth element of the definition of encouragement of terrorism in the ATP is the content of 
the speech proscribed.
The stipulation reads that directly or indirectly encouraging or in other way inducing the public 
to the commission or preparation or instigation of an act  terrorism is proscribed. In the previous 
section, it was concluded that indirect incitement to terrorism may include glorification of 
terrorism, which present terrorist acts as necessary and justified.191 
Though, the ATP is silent on what constitutes direct and indirect encouragement or other 
inducement, it is apparent that direct encouragement forms direct incitement of terrorist acts 
while indirect encouragement implies glorification of terrorism. On the other hand, what 
constitutes other inducement is left with no feasible standard in determining which acts fall 
within its scope. Generally  it  can be concluded that as far as the content of speech proscribed is 
concerned, the scope of the proscription covers direct encouragement, glorification and in any 
other way inducement to terrorist acts, leaving it as the broadest in terms of its application. 
- The last consideration is if the requirement of mens rea on the part  of the person liable of 
encouragement of terrorism is necessary.
Intent to bring about the commission of a terrorist act  or offense has been treated as a condition 
for prohibiting the speech.192  However, the ATP’s stipulation on encouragement of terrorism 
lacks the element of the subjective intention on the part of the perpetuator of the act. 
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On the other hand, the Criminal Code provides that a crime is completed when the legal, material 
and mental elements are present.193 It further provides that  a crime is only  committed where a 
person acts intentionally or negligently.194In the case of encouragement of terrorism in the ATP, 
the mental element of the crime is not provided for, hence, can be argued no crime. To what 
extent such argument is acceptable by Ethiopian Courts is another issue but the law is clear, no 
mental element hence no criminal responsibility.   
Generally, when the ATP’s provision on encouragement of terrorism is weighed in light of the 
CECPT definition of provocation of terrorism and the Report  it comes short of a number of the 
elements contained in the latter. That is the ATP’s stipulation that proscribes encouragement of 
terrorism strictly meets only the first element of the existence of an act  of communication 
whereas it partly  covers one aspect of the “objective” requirement in assessing the existence of a 
danger of commission of terrorist act while it totally fails to address the subjective intention of 
the person who communicates the encouraging statement. As noted above, the last two elements 
on which the proclamation fails partly and totally are generally accepted as parameters of 
“proportionality” test.195 Hence, the stipulation can be ruled as not proportional on the basis of 
these tests. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the punishment for encouraging terrorism is rigorous 
imprisonment from 10 to 20 years.196 Note here that committing acts of terrorism in the ATP is 
punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 15 years to life or with death.197 Moreover, grave 
crimes of homicide are punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 5 years 20 years to life or 
death in case of aggravated homicide.198 In my opinion, the gravity of the punishment applicable 
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on encouragement of terrorism can be used as one of the parameters to determine the 
proportionality of the restriction on freedom of expression, which takes us to the next section.    
3.3 Consistency of the stipulation on encouragement of terrorism with FDRE 
Constitution and CCPR  
A couple of interrelated issues were addressed in the last section of chapter two. The first is 
FDRE Constitution only provides for the tests of legality and in pursuance of the listed legitimate 
aims leaving the indispensable test  of necessity or proportionality aside. On the other hand 
FDRE Constitution provides for the permissible grounds of limitation, which are honor and 
reputations of others, wellbeing of the youth, prohibition of propaganda of war and the public 
expression of an opinion that affects human dignity. 
The conclusions made there are the premises for the discussion in the next sections. The  first 
premise is the “legitimate aims” as far as limitation laws on freedom of expression in Ethiopia 
are concerned are the grounds of honor and reputations of others, well being of the youth and 
prohibition of propaganda of war (which includes national security interests) and public 
expression of opinion intended to injure human dignity (which includes interests of reputation of 
others and public order) as contained in FDRE Constitution and intereprated in line with 
CCPR.Secondly, though the test of necessity  is not provided in the FDRE Constitution, it has 
been argued and concluded that this test is applicable in restricting freedom of expression.   
The three tier tests are discussed herein under followed by a concluding remark whether the anti 
terrorism proclamation’s provision on encouragement of terrorism is compatible with the 
pertinent provisions of FDRE Constitution and CCPR.
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3.3.1 The test of “provided by law” 
Both FDRE Constitution and CCPR provide that restriction on freedom of expression should be 
provided by law.199  The provision on encouragement of terrorism is contained in the anti 
terrorism proclamation, which has statutory status. Moreover, the proclamation has been 
published in the country’s law gazette which can be accessed by anyone in the stores by  paying a 
small amount of money. This roughly meets the requirement of accessibility.200 However, when 
one considers the fact that almost eighty percent of the Ethiopian population lives in rural areas 
where access to education and other basic infrastructure including the shops that sell 
proclamation is considerably limited, the accessibility of the ATP is put in question. Hence, it is 
hardly  possible to consider a law that is only accessible to twenty percent  of a given population 
meets the accessibility test. 
The stipulation  that proscribes encouragement of terrorism tries to address the objective test of 
probability  of causation between the act of encouragement and the commission or preparation or 
instigation of an act of terrorism.201  Accordingly, the likelihood of the understanding of the 
addressee of the encouragement statement is the only parameter for the determination of the 
causal link, which does not enable the author or the one who causes the publication of an 
encouraging statement to foresee what is the level of the understanding. 
Moreover, the the proscription on free speech in ATP covers direct and indirect encouragement of 
terrorism or other inducement to terrorism. As pointed out above the stipulation fails to define 
each of these. Especially, the last  act of “other inducement” leaves the scope of the stipulation 
very broad allowing for the arbitrary inclusion of any  act within its ambit. Hence, as regards 
what type of speech is proscribed, the ATP stipulation on encouragement of terrorism is not clear. 
Furthermore, the proscription of encouragement of terrorism does not provide for the mens rea of 
the perpetrator of the communication. Thus, a person cannot foresee what is the mental 
requirement for criminal responsibility of encouragement of terrorism. On the other hand, the 
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fact that the proscription gives reference to terrorist acts, which are vaguely and inadequately 
defined in the ATP, precludes an individual from precisely foreseeing the consequences of her 
acts. 
The provision on encouragement of terrorism can generally  be ruled as imprecise, which is 
vague and in some cases silent on very crucial points.  It also makes reference to broad and 
vague definition of terrorist acts.  Accordingly, a reasonable person cannot foresee with sufficient 
precision what is punishable under the proclamation on the basis of encouragement of terrorism 
where he publishes or causes the publication of a statement. 
The provision of the ATP that proscribes encouragement of terrorism, hence only meets the test 
that the prohibition must be provided in formal law while it fails short of being accessible to 
most Ethiopians and precisely provide for the acts that  are proscribed therein. Therefore, the 
prohibition fails to meet the test of “provided by law”. The Committee noted that the broad and 
vague definition of ‘encouragement of terrorism‘ is inconsistent with CCPR as it  application may 
lead to disproportionate interference with freedom of expression.202      
      
3.3.2 The test of “in pursuance of one of  legitimate aims”
The legitimate aims on the basis of which freedom of expression can be limited are honor and 
reputations of others, wellbeing of the youth,  prohibition of propaganda of war, which may 
include protection of national security  and prohibition of public expression intended to injure 
human dignity that may similarly  be used to protect public order and honor and reputations of 
others.203 
It is generally agreed that protection of national security and public order which are also 
recognized in the preamble of the ATP are the pertinent legitimate grounds for counter terrorism 
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laws including proscription of encouragement of terrorism.204  Similarly, the Committee in A.K 
and A.R V Uzbekistan noted that threats to national security interests, which relate to violently 
overthrowing a government and rights of others are pertinent grounds to limit  expression in 
countering terrorism.205  If one sticks to this assertion, only the grounds of prohibition of 
propaganda of war and public opinion intended to injure human dignity, which may  include 
national security and public order interests respectively are the pertinently  applicable grounds of 
limiting freedom of expression as far as encouragement of terrorism is concerned. I however, 
decided to analyze each ground and find out if there is any pertinent aspect of these grounds that 
legitimize the proscription of encouragement of terrorism. 
i) Well being of the youth
In chapter two of this thesis,  the possible cases of expression that endanger the well being of the 
child, which is one aspect of well being of the youth were pointed as pornography, indoctrination 
and brainwashing. The fact that terrorism is led by intolerant extremist ideologies, the chance 
whereby children who are naturally  innocent  can be victims of indoctrination and brainwashing 
of terrorist ideologies is high. This poses a danger to the physical wellbeing of children, who 
may be used as tool of terrorists especially  as suicide bombers. Moreover, indoctrination of 
children to extremism endangers their moral wellbeing, which should be built upon awareness of 
human rights and tolerance to differences. Hence, wellbeing of the youth within the above scope 
and meaning can be used to restrict speech that encourages terrorism so as to protect the 
psychological and physical wellbeing of the youth.     
ii) Honor and reputation of others
States are not only  entitled but also required to put statutory protection against intentional 
infringement on honor and reputation by untrue assertions.206  The protection of the honor and 
reputation of others is best  served by special measures provided for in the media laws of most 
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states.207Hence, the provisions in the Media Law not proscription of encouragement of terrorism 
in the ATP can rightly do the job of protecting the honor and reputations of others.208 
iii) Public opinion intended to injure human dignity
In chapter two it was asserted that human dignity within the context of exercise of freedom of 
expression can be used to restrict speech that target the inherent worth of human beings.209 It was 
further argued that this ground can be equated with the ground of prohibition of advocacy of 
hatred in article 20(2) of CCPR, which according to Nowak is necessary for the protection of 
honor and reputations of others and public order.210 Since, honor and reputation of others are best 
served by Media Laws, the pertinent aspect of this ground for the purpose of proscribing 
encouragement of terrorism will be its appeal to public order, which calls for equality and non 
discrimination on the basis of which a democratic society should be founded.
iv) Prohibition of propaganda of war
FDRE Constitution provides for the prohibition of propaganda of war as one of the permissible 
grounds for limiting freedom of expression.211 In chapter two of this thesis, it  has been concluded 
that prohibition of propaganda of war is a specific additional limitation ground to those which 
are already provided in Article 19(3) of CCPR. Manfred Nowak further argues that prohibition of 
propaganda of war is necessary for the protection of national security.212 Hence, prohibition of 
propaganda of war in the FDRE Constitution can roughly be equated with the permissible ground 
of protecting national security. Hence, the ground of national security, which is impliedly 
covered by the prohibition of propaganda of war in the FDRE Constitution can be the legitimate 
ground for limiting an expression, which encourages terrorist acts within the meaning of the ATP. 
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On the other hand, it is imperative to briefly look at the existing legal provisions relating to 
prohibition of propaganda of war in the Criminal Code. Publicly provoking others by  word of 
mouth, images or writings, or launching or disseminating, systematically  and with premeditation 
by word of mouth, images or writings, inaccurate, hateful, or subversive information or 
insinuations calculated to demoralize the public and to undermine its confidence is criminalized 
entailing simple imprisonment or where the foreseeable consequences of the provocation are 
particularly grave with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding ten years.213 Provocation of others 
to commit crimes against the Constitution or the State and against the external security and 
defensive power of the state is hence, punishable in the Criminal Code.214 The special criminal 
liability of the author, originator or publisher (the mass media) of a statement relating to  the 
above crimes is also provided in the Criminal Code.215In such cases, the author, originator or the 
publisher of a given statement that relates to one of the crimes above will assume a special 
criminal responsibility as a principal criminal or an instigator or an accomplice.216 
The aforementioned stipulations of the Criminal Code are destined to limit those speeches that 
are thought to be propaganda of war. Hence, prohibition of propaganda of war as one of the 
legitimate grounds for limiting freedom of expression has well been served by the provisions of 
the Criminal Code. The question then arises what part of the prohibition of propaganda of war 
has not been covered by the above mentioned articles that would necessarily call for the 
protection of the interest  by  introducing new law that proscribes encouragement of terrorism. 
This issue will rightly be addressed in the test of proportionality.
In concluding the discussion, it has been pointed out the prohibition of propaganda of war, which 
may include interests of national security  and protection of human dignity from demeaning and 
humiliating statements, which implicitly covers the ground of public order and wellbeing of the 
youth are pertinent legitimate ground in proscribing encouragement of terrorism. 
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3.3.3 The test of “necessity”
Though FDRE Constitution does not provide for the test of proportionality  or necessity while 
limiting freedom of expression, it  was argued and concluded, that the test should be included by 
interpreting the Constitution in line with CCPR. In principle any limitation on the free enjoyment 
of rights and freedoms must be necessary in the pursuit of a pressing objective, and its impact on 
rights and freedoms strictly  proportional to the nature of that objective.217 To be necessary, a 
rational link must exist between the limiting measure and the pursuit of the particular objective, 
which will normally  be accepted if the measure logically  furthers the objective, although more 
evidence of this connection might be necessary  if such a link is not plainly  evident.218 For the 
purposes of determining the importance of a particular measure’s objective, it  will be instructive 
to determine: how the measure is linked with the countering of an actual or potential threat of 
terrorism against the state; the measure’s contribution to international and regional frameworks 
on counter terrorism as well as, subsidiarily, its contribution to other national interests of the 
state.219 
The pressing objectives to be protected by proscribing encouragement of terrorism in the ATP are 
prohibiting propaganda of war (interests of national security) and statements intending to injure 
human dignity (interests of public order) and protection of the wellbeing of the youth. It can be 
concluded, therefore, there are pressing objectives. The question proceeds as, is the proscription 
of encouragement of terrorism capable of achieving these legitimate aims.220  The provision on 
encouragement of terrorism as it stands there is capable of furthering the legitimate aims. Given 
the fact that freedom of expression especially the media are exploited by terrorists to 
communicate their deeds, to incite others to commit terrorist acts and create a hub for recruiting 
new members and to indoctrinate others to extremism the danger that such communication poses 
to these legitimate aims is considerable. Accordingly, limiting freedom of expression as regards 
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those statements that encourage terrorist acts has a logical link in promoting the protection of 
national security , public order and wellbeing of the youth . Moreover, the proscription of 
encouragement of terrorism in Ethiopia promotes the counter terrorism efforts within the horn of 
Africa, which further gives an input to the international counter terrorism endeavors given the 
location of Somalia in the horn of Africa. Hence, proscription of encouragement of terrorism in 
Ethiopia does not only  protect the national interests of the country  but also support the regional 
and international counter terrorism efforts. 
The second element of the test of necessity is that the limiting measure must be the least 
restrictive means to achieve the relevant purpose.221Accordingly, is the proscription of 
encouragement of terrorism in the ATP the least restrictive measure in limiting freedom of 
expression in order to protect public order, national security and well being of the youth. A 
number of parameters can be used to arrive an answer to this question. 
First comes the consideration of those rules in the Criminal Code of Ethiopia, which prohibit 
provocation to commit crimes against the Constitution or the State and against the external 
security and defensive power of the state222  and those which provide for a special criminal 
responsibility of an author, originator or publisher of a provoking and inciting and misleading 
statements.223 I argue that these rules cover acts that encourage terrorist acts by criminalizing acts 
that provoke and incite others to commit crimes including crimes against humanity and armed 
uprising though they do not provide for the act specifically. Hence, the introduction of ATP 
which specifically provide for encouragement of terrorist acts is partly redundant as the acts are 
already governed by the provisions in the Criminal Code. If a need arises to specifically  address 
the issue of encouragement of terrorist acts so as to respond to the calls of the Resolution, 
amendment of the existing laws to specifically include the act would have sufficed. This 
conclusion seems more appropriate where one considers the intensity  and severity of the ATP’s 
stipulation on encouragement of terrorism vis a vis those applicable for general acts of 
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provocation and incitement. I similarly  argue that public order can be protected by  the general 
rules on provocation and incitement in the Criminal Code, which particularly cover crimes 
against humanity, armed uprising and crimes that target the security and integrity of the state. 
Secondly, the ATP stipulation on encouragement of terrorism covers wide range of acts. These 
are directly or indirectly encouraging or in any other way  inducing not only for commission of 
terrorist acts but also instigation or preparation for an act of terrorism. Hence, the stipulation is 
intensive as it  covers a wide range of acts. Moreover, the punishment imposed for encouraging 
terrorism under the ATP is severely  huge, which is ten to twenty years of imprisonment.224 Note 
that even committing an act of terrorism is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from fifteen 
years to life or with death.225  I strongly  argue that alesser punishment could have served the 
purpose of deterring individuals from publishing or causing the publication of statements that 
encourage terrorism.  Accordingly, the intensive nature of the application of the stipulation as 
regards encouragement of terrorism coupled with the severe punishment that the act entails leads 
to the conclusion that the limitation on freedom of expression by  proscribing encouragement of 
terrorism does not meet the test of being the least restrictive measure to achieve the legitimate 
purposes. 
Restricting rights and freedoms calls for a reasonable balance between the rights and interests at 
hand. Hence, freedom of expression should not be limited so considerably  leading to the 
jeopardy of the right itself at the expense of disproportionate protection of other rights and 
interests.226 Indeed, freedom of expression plays a crucial and indispensable role in democracy 
and in the exercise and enjoyment of other rights and freedoms. So are human dignity  (public 
order), national security  (prohibition of propaganda of war) and wellbeing of the youth. Hence, 
all interests and rights are in their own way important. Hence, restriction of a given right in order 
to promote another right or interest is not a matter of priority but balancing of these interests and 
rights depending on the circumstances. 
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The ability  and willingness of an author or a publisher to exercise their freedom of expression is 
substantially  limited with the existence of such severe and intense law that  proscribes 
encouragement of terrorism. Therefore, the right to freedom of expression is considerably and 
disproportionately limited by the ATP rule on encouragement of terrorism, which leads to 
substantial jeopardy of the right at the expense of disproportionate protection of public order, 
national security and wellbeing of the youth among which the two are already protected by less 
restrictive rules in the Criminal Code. Hence, the proscription of encouragement of terrorism 
does not  meet the test that there must  be a reasonable balance between the limiting measure and 
the aim pursued.               
On the other hand, it is generally  acceptable practice that  there must be a subjective intention on 
the part of the author of the provoking statement and an objective danger that her statement will 
create a danger that a terrorist act would be committed. These two criteria are widely  accepted as 
proportionality steps whereby any stipulation on incitement of terrorism should be tested 
against.227  The ATP stipulation on encouragement of terrorism, fails to provide for the subjective 
intention of the person responsible for encouragement of terrorism while its objective 
requirement only addresses one aspect of the requirement, which is the understanding of the 
addressee.  Failure in observing these two steps obviously means that the stipulation is not 
proportional. 
In concluding the discussion in this chapter, the following findings are worth noting. Except for 
being promulgated in the law gazette of Ethiopia, the stipulation on encouragement of terrorism 
fails to be accessible and precise. The pertinent  pressing social needs, which call for the 
criminalization of encouragement of terrorism are prohibition of propaganda of war and public 
opinion intended to injure human dignity and protection of the well being of the youth. It was 
further pointed out that there is a rational link between the pursuance of these legitimate aims 
and proscription of encouragement of terrorism.  On the other hand the stipulation was ruled as 
intense and severe that substantially undermine freedom of expression by appealing for an 
excessive and disproportionate protection of the pressing objectives. Furthermore, it fails to 
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provide for the mental requirement for the criminal responsibility of encouragement of terrorism 
nor does it provide for the internationally accepted requirement of objective probability  of harm. 
Hence, the stipulation on encouragement of terrorism can be ruled as disproportional and hence 
does not meet the necessity test. 
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Conclusion and recommendations 
The thesis examined the consistency of the ATP stipulation that proscribes encouragement of 
terrorism in light of the limitation clauses of freedom of expression under both FDRE 
Constitution and CCPR. 
The first step in such examination was identifying the scope of the definition of ‘terrorist acts’ in 
the ATP. It was found out in the first chapter of the thesis that the definition of ‘terrorist  acts‘ in 
the ATP is vague and broad, which creates a wide possibility  of arbitrary application of the 
definition on a variety of acts. Moreover, the definition of ‘terrorist acts‘ not only covers those 
crimes that target the lives and bodily integrity of individuals but also property  crimes and crimes 
against the historical and cultural heritages of the country, which are not ordinarily conceived as 
terrorist acts. Broad definition of terrorist acts results in the arbitrary application of all provisions 
of ATP particularly proscription of encouragement of terrorism to the detriment of rights and 
freedoms of individuals.  
As the criminalization of encouragement of terrorism or any terrorism related speech is destined 
to limit freedom of expression, the contents of the right  and the applicable legitimate limitations 
thereof have been discussed in chapter two of the thesis. Both FDRE Constitution and CCPR 
have been harmonized in ascertaining the exact content of freedom of expression. Due emphasis 
have been made to the three tests of ‘provided by law’, ‘in pursuance of legitimate aims’ and 
‘necessity’ that are applicable in analyzing the legitimacy  of any restricting law on freedom of 
expression. 
The ATP proscribes terrorist threats and encouragement of terrorism, which covers direct 
incitement or encouragement to terrorism, indirect encouragement and other forms of 
inducement that may amount to glorification of terrorism. Hence, the forms of speech that are 
proscribed in the ATP are terrorist threats, direct encouragement or incitement to terrorism and 
indirect encouragement or glorification of terrorism. Accordingly, almost all recognized forms of 
terrorism related speech are criminalized under the ATP. 
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Finally, the stipulation on encouragement of terrorism in the ATP has been analyzed in light of 
the three tests against which limitation laws should be weighed. The conclusion is, the stipulation 
fails to meet the test ‘provided by law‘ as it contains imprecise and vague terms and references, 
particularly its reference to the definition of ‘terrorist acts’, which disable a reasonable person 
from foreseeing what is actually sanctioned and the consequences of one acts. Moreover, it has 
been argued that the law fails to be accessible to most Ethiopians. Accordingly, except for the 
fact that the law has been enacted as a formal legislation, it comes short of the other elements of 
the test of ‘provided by law’.
The proscription of encouragement of terrorism in the ATP meets the test of ‘in pursuance of 
legitimate aims‘ as it  can be used for protecting well being of the youth, human dignity and 
prohibiting propaganda of war. It was pointed out the last  two grounds appeal for the protection 
of public order and national security. It  was further argued that these grounds are already 
protected by the provisions in the Criminal Code. 
The test of ‘proportionality‘ or ‘necessity‘ was the last  test considered to ascertain the legitimacy 
of the limitation on freedom of expression by the ATP. It was concluded that  the stipulation that 
proscribes encouragement to terrorism is too intense and severe that jeopardizes the right to 
freedom of expression at the expense of disproportionate protection of other rights and interests. 
It was further concluded that the proscription of encouragement of terrorism is not the least 
restrictive measure to attain the legitimate purposes. A lesser punishment or the application of the 
less grave provisions on general subversive advocacy  in the Criminal Code could have served the 
purposes of protection human dignity and the prohibition propaganda of war. Moreover, the 
stipulation fails to provide for the mental element of commission of crime, which may lead to a 
conclusion that there exists no crime where no mental element is provided. On the other hand, it 
also comes short of providing for the objective probability  of harm that  the encouraging 
statement entails. All these shortcomings of the stipulation lead us to a conclusion that it  fails to 
meet the test of ‘proportionality’.
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As the three tests are cumulative, it would have sufficed to show that the stipulation on 
encouragement of terrorism in the ATP fails short of only one of them. However, it is clear that 
the stipulation does not meet the two tests of ‘provided by law’ and ‘proportionality’ while it 
meets the test of ‘in pursuance of legitimate aims’. Hence, it can safely be concluded that the 
limitation regime on freedom of expression in the ATP is not permissible under both FDRE 
Constitution and CCPR. Therefore, the finding of the research is the rule that sanctions 
encouragement of terrorism is not only unconstitutional but also inconsistent with the 
international human rights commitment of Ethiopia under CCPR. FDRE Constitution provides 
that any stipulation that is not consistent with it is void from the outset.228 
Given the fact that freedom of expression is a right whereby other rights and freedoms are 
exercised, the implication of the conclusion that the proscription of encouragement of terrorism 
in the ATP is neither constitutional nor consistent  with CCPR is far reaching. Importantly, the 
democratic process of Ethiopia will severely  be hampered where freedom of expression is 
excessively limited. Moreover, as the freedom is related with freedom of association and 
freedom of assembly, which are equally important in democracy, the violation of the freedom by 
the ATP in a way violates these freedoms. Hence, these indispensable elements of democracy are 
jeopardized by  a single provision that  proscribes encouragement of terrorism. The fact that 
Ethiopia introduced new laws on civil and non governmental organizations, on media freedom 
and terrorism within the past two years ahead of the country wide election in May 2010 made the 
government susceptible of intending to suppress the political dissent in the country  through these 
laws. The cumulative effects of all these laws on the democratization process of the country is an 
interesting area for future studies. 
On the basis of the finding of the research, which is the stipulation on encouragement of 
terrorism is not a legitimate restriction on freedom of expression, it is imperative to make some 
recommendations. One way of approaching the legitimacy of the law can be amending the rules 
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in the Criminal Code so that they clearly  include terrorist acts and repealing the provision in the 
ATP that proscribes encouragement of terrorism. 
On the other hand, if it is argued that  the proscription of encouragement of terrorism should 
specifically be addressed in the ATP, it  should be amended to be constitutional and consistent 
with CCPR. Since proscription of encouragement of terrorism gives reference to definition of 
terrorist acts in ATP, amendment of the following aspects of the provisions on ‘terrorist acts‘ and 
‘encouragement of terrorism‘ are recommended.
The first general step is to clearly provide for the acts of terrorism and encouragement of 
terrorism in the ATP.  Hence, all vague and ambiguous terms in both rules as are identified in this 
research should be replaced by precise terms to enable individuals to reasonably foresee the 
consequences of their actions. 
Terrorist acts should only include those acts which are ordinarily  conceived as such i.e property 
crimes and crimes against the historical and cultural heritage, environment and natural resources 
should be excluded from the definition. 
   
The rule on encouragement of terrorism should provide for the objective requirement of risk of 
harm that results from the published encouraging statement. 
It should provide for the mental element of commission of an act of encouragement of terrorism. 
The scope of encouragement of terrorism should be limited to direct encouragement and not 
indirect encouragement and other inducement of terrorism. Moreover, the encouragement should 
only relate to commission of and not preparation or instigation of terrorist acts.   
The punishment applicable on encouraging terrorism should be lesser than that is already 
provided. The punishment should give reasonable weight for the importance of freedom of 
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expression in a democratic society and the danger a terrorism encouraging statement poses to the 
pertinent  legitimate interests protected.   
The proclamation should be made accessible to all Ethiopians by ensuring the ways they can get 
it easily. Moreover, the public should be educated about the contents of the law and its 
application.  
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